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On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 
Played by Non-Bayesian Players 
By N. Megiddo ,  Tel Avivl ) 
Abstract: Unlike in the traditional theory of games of incomplete information, the players here are 
not Bayesian, i.e. a player does not necessarily have any prior probability distribution as to  what 
game is being played. The game is infinitely repeated. A player may be absolutely uninformed, i.e. 
he may know only how many strategies he has. However, after each play the player is informed 
about his payoff and, moreover, he has perfect recall. A strategy is described, that with probability 
unity guarantees (in the sense of the liminf of the average payoff) in any game, whatever the player 
could guarantee if he had complete knowledge of the game. 
1. Introduction 
A game is said to be of incomplete information if at least one player does not know 
exactly which game is being played. Harsanyi [1967-681  proposed an embedding of 
the games of incomplete information within the class of games of complete informa- 
tion. The embedding is based on the assumption that the players are Bayesian. Specifi- 
cally, the game is assumed to have been chosen by chance, with probability distribu- 
tion which is itself public knowledge. Also, some information about chance's choice 
has been revealed to different players, according to rules that are themselves public 
knowledge. Essentially, different players have different prior probability distributions 
with respect to the game being played. As the game (i.e.  the game that has once been 
chosen by chance) is repeated, these probabilities may be updated and, typically, a 
player has to consider future changes in other players' probability distributions that 
may be caused by his own decisions in the present. 
Following Harsanyi [1967-681,  contributions to this field have been made by 
(alphabetically)  Aumann/Maschler [  19681,  Kohlberg [  1975a, b], Mertens [ 19731,  Mer- 
tens/Zamir [1971-721,  PonssardlZamir [1973], Stearns [I9671 and Zamir [1971-72, 
19731. All these papers deal with infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum games. They 
all assume that an uninformed player is also not informed about his payoff at the end 
of each stage; his payoffs are rather credited (or debited) somehow to his bank ac- 
count, and he never receives any statements. On the other hand, he is informed about 
his opponent's choice according to prescribed rules. 
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In general, an informed player in a repeated game of incomplete information can 
take advantage of the fact that his opponent is uninformed about the payoffs. A 
0  1  known example is as follows. The game being repeatedly played is  I  1 .  How- 
ever, while player I (the rows player) is informed about the game, piayer I1 Htarts with 
prior probabilities of .5  for the true game and .5  for  .  If player I mixes his  lo  OI 
both pure strategies with the same probability, then piayer I1 never gains any addi- 
tional information, and his optimal strategy under these circumstances is also to mix 
his both pure strategies with equal probabilities. Thus, the expected payoff is 114 per 
stage. On the other hand, the value of the same game with complete information is of 
course zero. 
In this paper we  consider a model which is quite different from the traditional one. 
In the first place, our players are not necessarily Bayesian, i.e. they do not necessarily 
have any prior probability distributions as to which game is being played. Secondly, 
the players are informed about their payoffs at the end of each stage, and they have 
perfect recall with respect to these payoffs. Our goal is to present a strategy for an ab- 
solutely uninformed player, that essentially guarantees him in any game, whatever he 
could guarantee if he were completely informed. 
The game does not have to be two-person zero-sum. By playing our strategy, an unin- 
formed player is guaranteed in any non-cooperative n-person game, to get as a long-run 
average, a payoff that is not less than his maximin expected payoff in the one-shot 
game with complete information. 
After an earlier version of this paper had been issued [Megiddo, 19791, the author 
learned from Professor T. Ferguson about BaRos'paper [1968]. Surprisingly, no refer- 
ence to  Bai'zos [I9681 is found in the literature on games of incomplete information. 
As a matter of fact, Baiios proposed a strategy that essentially guarantees the same 
thing which is guaranteed by the strategy of the present paper. However, Baiios' 
strategy is complicated and the present author believes that the strategy introduced 
here may shed more light on the problem, since its construction is simpler and intui- 
tive. 
2. The Strategy 
The game that is being repeated infinitely many times is given in the normal form, 
i.e. a real r by c matrix G. Player I is the rows player and I1 is the columns player. The 
entries correspond to payoffs made by player I1 to player I. Even though we  formulate 
everything in terms of two-person zero-sum games, the results can be interpreted in a 
more general setup, if G  is the matrix of player 1's  payoff where columns correspond 
to  joint strategies of all other players. 
The strategy presented below is meant for player I. However, all player I needs to 
know at the start, is the number r. It is assumed that player I is informed about his 
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We  start with an overview of the main ideas in the construction of our strategy. 
Roughly, the strategy may be  viewed as a never-ending search for the optimal mixed 
strategy s (G) of the real game G being played. During this search we  discover strate- 
gies that yield increasing maximin payoffs. However, since we keep experimenting 
with new strategies, we  frequently have to employ the previously discovered "good" 
strategies, in order to compensate for losses incurred during those "experiments." 
The search for the optimal strategy of G relies on the following hierarchy of games. 
Let Cn  =  {Gy ,  . .  . ,  G",}  be the set of all r X n game-matrices, whose entries are of 
the form kln, where k is an integer such that I  k I <  n2 (hence m,  = (2n2 + 1)'")  and 
v (Gy) >  . . .  >  v (Gin).  Let  I  G' I denote the largest absolute value of an entry in G'. 
For n >  c, by replicating the last column of G so as to form an r X n matrix, we  can 
talk about the "distance"  I  G,?  -  G I between G and Gy . 
Our first observation is that an uninformed player can statistically test the follow- 
ing hypothesis. The real game G is "close"  to a given game G'. Such an hypothesis is 
tested by repeatedly playing the optimal strategy of G' and comparing the average pay- 
off so obtained with the value of G'. If that observed average is significantly less than 
the value of G', then the hypothesis is rejected. During our search we may accept 
games which are "far"  from G,  however that does not cause any loss in the long-run. 
Obviously, for a sufficiently large n,  we  can find in Cn  a game Gz which is arbi- 
trarily close to G. Now, suppose that we successively test (relative to the above hy- 
pothesis) the games Gy, GJ, . .  . ,  G;"  in this order, until the first acceptance. Obvi- 
ously, by letting the number of plays in a single test be sufficiently large, we  can 
guarantee (with probability arbitrarily close to one) that the average payoff observed 
in the last test will be greater than v (G) -  E,  for an arbitrarily small E >  0.  Further- 
more, we can design the test so that the conditional probabilities p,,  of accepting Gi", 
given that it is tested, converge sufficiently fast to one. That rate of convergence 
could be chosen so as to guarantee (with probability one) that rejections of games Gi", 
occur only finitely many times. 
The principle now is quite simple. We  keep testing games of Cn  with increasing n, 
while frequently compensating for the losses by playing strategies of "accepted" 
games. The values of the accepted games constitute a sequence whose liminf is not 
less that v (G). Even if a game G' is accepted by statistical error or by a "trick"  of the 
opponent, it will be rejected later if it does not compensate as anticipated. In other 
words, the average payoff from any accepted game is continuously being watched and 
a test stops only with rejection. 
The following sequence plays a key role in the construction of the strategy: 
We  are now ready to describe our strategy for player I in an infinitely repeated 
game. We  describe the strategy in a form of an algorithm which includes the operation 
"play."  Specifically, the algorithm is run for definite amounts of time between consec- 
utive plays of the game G, and always provides play=  I with a strategy for the follow- 
ing stage. STACK is our pool of previously tested and accepted games. 160  N.  Megiddo 
Strategy S 
0.  Initialize with STACK = g andjk = 0 (k = 1,  2, . . .). 
1. Set n to the least number such that both  j,  <  mn and for every STACK member 
G,?',  k <  n. 
2. jn =jn  + 1. 
3. Repeat steps 3  1 and 32  K, times: 
3 1. If STACK =  (?I  then go to 32;  otherwise let G; be that STACK member whose 
upper index k is maximal. Play s (G:)  during n3mn  consecutive stages, subject 
to the following discipline: If at any time the average payoff for plays of s(G;) 
so far drops below v (G;) -  l/k,  then immediately remove G;  from STACK 
and go to 1. 
32. Play s (Gi",) once. 
4. If the average payoff for plays of s (Gi",) SO far is at least v (Gi",) -  l/n,  then place 
Gi  in STACK. 
5. Go to 1. 
The actual payoff at every stage depends of course only on the pure strategies chosen 
by the players. If mixed strategies are used, then the payoffs are random variables. 
Our main theorem is 
Theorem: If player I plays strategy S and player 11  plays any strategy, then the payoff 
sequence XI,  X,, . . . satisfies. 
14  liminf - Z  Xi 2 v (G) 
q+m  4  i=1 
3. Proof of the Theorem 
Before proving the theorem we state several lemmas. Recall that by I G'  I  we mean 
the maximum absolute value of an entry in G'. 
Lemma I: For every n 2 Max  (I  G I, c)  there is a game Gi", (1 <  in <  m,)  such that if 
I plays s (Gi",)  in G, then his expected payoff is at least v (Gi",) -  I/(%). 
Proofi  Without loss of generality we assume that n =  c = I G  I, since columns of G 
may always be replicated without affecting the value. Obviously, there is a game 
Gi", (1 <  i <  m,),  such that the absolute difference between any entry of Gi", and the 
corresponding entry of G is not less than lI(2.n). That implies our claim. 
Corollary:  I  v (Gn ) -  v (G)  1 G I/(%). 
In 
Lemma 2:  Let Y1, Y,, . . . be a sequence of independent random (0,l)-variables, On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information  161 
such that pk  E  Prob {Yk  = 1) = 2-11~~  (k = 1,  2, . . .). Under these conditions, with 
probability one, there is a number K such that for  every k >  K, Yk = 1. 
Proof:  For every K >  0,  let AK be the event in which Yk = 1 for all k >  K.  Obvious- 
ly, 
Thus, 
For any n >  Max (I G I, c),  let Gi", be the game whose existence is asserted in 
Lemma 1. Also, let 
16n4 
Lemma 3:  Suppose that player I repeatedly plays the strategy s (Gi",),  where 
n >  Max  (I G I, c),  in an infinitely repeated play  of G. Under these conditions, with 
probability not less than 2-lI2",  for every k >  Kn the average payoff for the first  k 
stages is at least v (Gt  ) -  l/n. 
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that player I1 repeatedly plays his best-reply 
strategy with respect to s (Gi",)  in G.  Let Xi be the payoff for the i-th stage 
(i  = 1,2,  .  . .). XI,  X2,  .  . . are mutually independent random variables with the same 
expectation ,u  >  v (G?) -  1/2n (Lemma 1) and the same variance 02 <  n2. 
In 
Kolmogorov's inequality [see Feller, p. 2201 states: For every E >  0 and integer 4, 
Prob  (VkGq)  %  $  {  i=1 
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We  now turn to the proof of the theorem. First, note that during a play of the in- 
finitely repeated game, the variable n in strategy S exceeds any finite value. Also, the 
variables  j,  change monotonically and hence each one of them finally attains some 
maximal value Jn (1 <  J, <  m,). Given any sequence of strategychoices by player 11, 
J, may be viewed as a random variable. 
For every n 2  Max (I  G  I, c),  let in be the lower index of the game 
Gn (1 <  in <  m,) whose existence is asserted in Lemma 1. 
In 
Assertion 4:  For every n >  Max (I  G I, c), 
112"  Prob {Jn <  in)  2  2-  . 
Proof:  In order for J, to exceed in,  it is necessary that strategy s (Gt)  is played k 
times, where k >  Kn,  and the average payoff per play for these plays is less than 
v (Gi",) -  lln.  However, the probability of such an event is, by Lemma 3, less than 
1 -  2-112". 
Assertion 5: The probability that there is N, such that Jn <  in for all n 2  N,  is one. 
Proofi  The proof follows from Lemma 2 and Assertion 4. However, note that the 
events(Jn <  in)  are not independent, since the number of times a strategy s (Cr) is 
played does depend on average payoffs obtained during plays of another strategy 
s  Thus, we have to use the following argument. Suppose that the player ex- 
tends his play of the strategy s (GJ"  ) beyond strategy S. Suppose that he keeps play-  " 
ing it, against a fictitious player, adong as the average payoff remains above 
v (GJ"  ) -  lln.  If it drops below that level, he switches to playing s (GJ"  and so on. 
Let J,*  be the final value of j,  in such a fictitious play. Obviously, the events 
{J,* <  in)  are mutually independent and with probability one there is N such that 
Jn <J;<in  for alln2N. 
Henceforth, let N be fured as that number which exists with probability one accord- 
ing to Assertion 5. 
For any time t and every game G!  that has entered STACK at one time prior to t, On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information  163 
we use the following notation. By Z:  (t) we mean the average payoff per play, for 
plays performed prior to t, of either s (G:)  or of some s (G;)  immediately following a 
k  play of s (Gi  ), but such that Gt  was not a member of STACK at any time prior to t. 
Assertion 6: 1f Gf  enters STACK at time to and if k >  N, then for all t >  to, 
Z:  (t) >  v (G) -  S/k. 
Proof: First note that as long as G;  belongs to STACK, the average payoff for plays 
of s (G!)  remains at least v (G!)  -  Ilk.  We  now estimate the impact of plays of 
s (Gc) on 2:  (1). Since each play of s (Gc)  (which is included in Z? (t)) has been 
preceded by at least n3mn  plays of s (G;),  it follows that the average payoff for plays 
either of s  (G:)  or of a specific s (G!n)  preceded by s (G;),  (note that n >  k) is not 
less than 
Thus, if C:  is still in STACK at time t, then 
1f G:  leaves STACK at time t, then since s (G:)  has been played at least Kk  times. 
Finally, once a game G,k leaves STACK, s ((2:)  in  never played again. Thus, since 
k>N,forallt>to 
~et  N?  (t) denote the number of plays accounted under 2;  (t). It follows that the 
average payoff per play, for all plays prior to t,  is 
Z N;  (t) z;  (t) 
k,i  z (t) = 
z N!  (t) 
9 
k,i 
(when 2:  (t) may be set arbitrarily to v (G) ifNf (t) = 0). Note that N:  (t) is mono- 
tone non-decreasing and has some maximal value N:.  For any t, N.  Megiddo 
Given any number M, for any t, 
M  "k 
L:  L:  N:  (5/k) 
Z(t)>v(G)-  k=l i=l  5  -- 
2 N? (t)  M' 
k,i 
Since  X N!  (t) +  =  as t increases, it finally follows that liminf Z (t) 2  v (G). This 
k,i  t-t - 
completes the proof of the theorem. 
4. Discussion 
When a completely informed player plays an optimal mixed strategy in an infinitely 
repeated game, then he guarantees, in general, no more than that with probability one 
the lirninf of the average actual payoff will not be less than v (G). This is precisely 
what can be guaranteed by an absolutely uninformed player. However, one may argue 
that payoffs should be  discounted, rather than averaged in the long run. It seems hard 
to analyze what precisely can be guaranteed in terms of a discount factor 
a  (0 <  cr  < 1). However, in the light of the lemma proved in the appendix the follow- 
ing is true. For every e >  0 there is a, (0 <  a. <  1)  such that for all a 2 ao,  (a  <  I), 
strategy S guarantees the discounted payoff  2 aixi  to be at least (v  (G) -  €)/(I -  a). 
i= 0 
Another common approach in infinitely repeated games is to look at  lim  Vn/n, 
n-t- 
where  Vn is the value of the finitely repeated game with n stages. A finitely repeated 
game here has no value, since the players are not assumed to be Bayesian. However, if 
Vn is defined to be the amount that player I can guarantee as his expected payoff then 
strategy S  (followed up to n stages) guarantees expected payoffs such that  lim  Vn/n  = 
v (GI. 
n-t - 
We  should mention that it is much easier for an uninformed player to achieve his 
maximin payoff relative to pure strategies. This is done as follows. The player always 
plays either a pure strategy he has not played before, or, if all have been played, the 
one whose worst case payoff so far is the greatest among all worst-case payoffs so far. 
Playing like that, the number of stages, in which the player may be paid less than his 
maximin (in pure strategies), will not be greater than r -  1 (where r is the number of 
his pure strategies). 
It has been suggested by R.J. Aumann, J.F. Mertens, S. Sorin and S. Zamir that the 
latter idea can be generalized to the set of all mixed strategies for player 1. Thus, grids 
over the strategies simplex have to  be selected, which have to get finer and finer, and 
the player has to "experiment" with mixed strategies belonging to these grids. "Com- 
pensation" may be provided by playing the best (in the sense of average payoff yield- 
ed) strategy so far. "Experiments"  should however be performed only during a subse- 
quence of stages whose density within the grand sequence is zero. J.P.  Mertens has also 
pointed out that another strategy may be constructed by repeatedly applying the idea On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information  165 
of [Aumann/Maschler]  for the case when player  1 knows that G is in some finite set of 
games. Again, there has to be some "compensation"  factor whenever a new round of 
considering a larger set of games begins. 
Finally, one may wonder about the rate of convergence of the average payoff to 
the value of the game, while strategy S is being played. We  were, of course, quite 
generous in selecting the different parameters of the strategy. It is conceivable that 
a more careful design of a learning strategy would lead to a better convergence rate, 
especially in situations where a player does have some partial information about the 
game at the start. However, our goal here was only to point out the feasibility of 
guaranteeing the value in the long-run under any circumstances. 
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Appendix 
Lemma:  If  (an  },"=  is a bounded sequence then 
m  2  ai <  liminf (1 -  a) Z  anan  liminf - 
n-tm  n+  1  i=o  a-l-  n=O 
This lemma is in fact a special case of an Abelian theorem stated in Widder [ 194  1 1. 
Specifically, apply Theorem 1 on p. 18 1 with y = 1, e-S = a,  and a (t)  a step-function 
with jumps at the positive integers, whose sizes are a,. For the sake of completeness 
we provide here a simple proof for our special case. 
Proof: Without loss of generality we  assume that 
1  " 
liminf -  Z:  ai=O and  IaiI<l  (i=0,1,  ...  ). 
n+m  n + 1  i=o 
n 
Denote Sn = Z:  ai.  It follows that for all a,  0 <a  < 1, 
i= 0 
lim  Sn an = 0. 
n-+m 
That implies 
w  n-1 
Z  akak = lim  f.  akak = lim  [(I  -a)  Z  Sk a* +  Snan] 
k=O  n-t-  k=O  n-r-  k=O 166  N.  Megiddo 
Let e >  0  be given and let N  be such that for every n >  N,  Sn/(n + 1) > -  €14. Let 
N-1 
a, be such that for all a,  a, <  a<  1, (1 -  a)2  22  Snan  > -  €12. 
n=O 
Note that 
and let a2  be such that for all a  (g  <  a <  1) f (a) <  2. It follows that for all a such 
thatMax(al,a2)<a< 1, 
m 
That implies that liminf (1 -a)  Z  anan  >  0  and hence completes the proof. 
a-1-  n=O 
Remark:  Under the same conditions it is known that liminf  f:  oi  Z 
,+,  n + 1 i=0 
00 
liminf (1 -  a) Z  anan. 
a+l-  n=O 
[See Titchmarsh]. 
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